Efficient data structures for masks on 2D grids

This article discusses various methods of representing and manipulating arbitrary coverage information in two dimensions, with a focus on space- and time-efficiency when processing such coverages, storing them on disk, and transmitting them between computers. While these considerations were originally motivated by the specific tasks of representing sky coverage and cross-matching catalogues of astronomical surveys, they can be profitably applied in many other situations as well.Comment: accepted by A&

High-level synthesis under I/O Timing and Memory constraints

The design of complex Systems-on-Chips implies to take into account communication and memory access constraints for the integration of dedicated hardware accelerator. In this paper, we present a methodology and a tool that allow the High-Level Synthesis of DSP algorithm, under both I/O timing and memory constraints. Based on formal models and a generic architecture, this tool helps the designer to find a reasonable trade-off between both the required I/O timing behavior and the internal memory access parallelism of the circuit. The interest of our approach is demonstrated on the case study of a FFT algorithm

Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.Strategic market games, Clearinghouses, Credit evaluation, Default

Strategic Freedom, Constraint, and Symmetry in One-period Markets with Cash and Credit Payment

In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these "strategic market games" well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Strategic market games, Clearinghouses, Credit evaluation, Default

Commodity Money and the Valuation of Trade

In a previous essay we modeled the enforcement of contract, and through it the provision of money and markets, as a production function within the society, the scale of which is optimized endogenously by labor allocation away from primary production of goods. Government and a central bank provided fiat money and enforced repayment of loans, giving fiat a predictable value in trade, and also rationalizing the allocation of labor to government service, in return for a fiat salary. Here, for comparison, we consider the same trade problem without government or fiat money, using instead a durable good (gold) as a commodity money between the time it is produced and the time it is removed by manufacture to yield utilitarian services. We compare the monetary value of the two money systems themselves, by introducing a natural money-metric social welfare function. Because labor allocation both to production and potentially to government of the economy is endogenous, the only constraint in the society is its population, so that the natural money-metric is labor. Money systems, whether fiat or commodity, are valued in units of the labor that would produce an equivalent utility gain among competitive equilibria, if it were added to the primary production capacity of the society.Bureaucracy, Contract enforcement, Taxes, Money